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Abstract 
While a vast literature has analysed the wage and employment effects of active labor market 
programs (ALMPs), a welfare analysis of such programs is seldom implemented (Kluve and 
Schmidt, 2002). In an attempt to measure the welfare effect of a wage subsidy on youth 
labor,  this  paper  performs  a  rudimentary  cost-benefit  analysis  of  Italy’s  training  and 
employment enhancing program directed at young workers (CFL, Contratti di Formazione e 
Lavoro). 
In particular, the analysis highlights the fact that the welfare effect of a targeted wage 
subsidy – in the form of a payroll tax rebate for firms employing youth labor – crucially 
depends on whether the labor market is affected by previous fiscal distortions generated 
either by the absence of linkage between payroll tax revenues and workers’ benefit, or by 
the presence of a wage floor. 
Based on reasonable estimates of youth labor demand and labor supply elasticities, it turns 
out that, in the absence of linkage between payroll tax revenues and benefits to young 
workers, the introduction of a 15% wage subsidy can be expected to generate a small 
employment gain (1 to 3 percentage points), and a net welfare gain – measured by the 
Marshallian approximation of employers’ and workers’ surplus – of less than €30 million 
(around 5% of the total cost of the welfare programme, amounting to almost €600 million), 
that could well be offset when the general equilibrium consequences of the selective wage 
subsidy are allowed for (substitution of non-eligible workers). 
On the other hand, in the presence of a wage floor that equals the current wage of young 
CFL workers, and a status quo youth involuntary unemployment rate of 18%, it is estimated 
that the 15% wage subsidy can generate a youth employment rise of up to 15 percentage 
points, and a net welfare gain of over €300 million – almost 50% of the total cost of the 
welfare programme. 
 
JEL classification: D61; J30. 
Key words: payroll tax; wage subsidy; minimum wage; cost-benefit analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
The  reduction  of  payroll  taxes  (social  security  contributions)  aimed  at  enhancing 
employment opportunities for low-wage earners has been on the agenda of many national 
governments for decades. In 1994, two authoritative European economists, J. Drèze and E. 
Malinvaud,  advocated  a  general  implementation  of  such  measures,  in  parallel  with  the 
introduction of a carbon tax aimed at financing it. 
In Western Europe generous rebates and/or holidays of social security contributions have 
been  granted  in  various  forms  and  areas  since  the  Seventies.  Many  of  such  programs 
provided temporary wage subsidies for selected groups of new hires. Target groups have 
often included young workers, especially those who belong to disadvantaged groups and 
areas.  
Much optimism was expressed in the past that well designed and targeted active labor 
market  programs  (ALMPs)  could  do  much  to  help  at-risk  youths.  Recently,  however, 
optimistic views have become rare (Kluve and Schmidt, 2002). As the OECD Employment 
Outlook  1999  put    it:  “we  know  how  difficult  it  is  to  develop  effective  labor  market 
policies for this group. Evaluation of past policies have been fairly discouraging in the 
sense  that  few  remedial  or  employment-insertion  programs  targeted  at  disadvantaged 
young people appear to have resulted in significant gains in employment or earnings after 
they have participated in the programs.” 
The  extent  of  substitution  between  the  target  group  and  other  workers  with  similar 
characteristics has been an important issue in Italy for several years (the so-called “young-
in, old-out” effect).
1  Growing doubts have been expressed also on the long term impact of 
labour cost reductions aimed at protecting the least skilled in the labour force. High-skill 
workers may be crowded out by low-skill, high turnover workers: in the long run this may 
have  serious  implications  on  the  waste  of  know-how  and  intellectual  resources.  
Deadweight losses and displacement effects are relevant, especially in connection with the 
option, open mainly to small firms, of operating in the regular vs. the irregular (black/grey) 
economy. The re-emersion programs aimed at fighting the irregular economy were (and 
still are) mainly based on SSC and other tax exemptions. Thus, on the one hand, if the 
incentives are too small and few firms decide to emerge, the displacement effect against 
“regular” firms persists. On the other hand, if the incentives produce visible effects, there 
could still be a large deadweight loss, as some firms may decide to leave the irregular 
economy  independently  of  the  incentive  itself.  The  displacement  effect  –  it  should  be 
                                                 
1 B. Contini and F. Rapiti (1994, 1999).   4 
recalled  –  is  the  main  source  of  concern  of  the  European  Commission  in  granting 
legitimacy to payroll tax rebates, on the grounds of potential unfair competition. As of 
today, targeted payroll tax rebates are legitimate (and may be financed via EU structural 
funds) only to the extent that new jobs are created by the same employer, in addition to 
existing ones. 
The fundamental argument that we put forward in this paper is that, in order to investigate 
the impact of the introduction of an employer side wage subsidy on youth labor, it is 
crucial to recognize and quantify the degree of previous fiscal distortions and inefficiencies 
to which the relevant labor market is subject to. 
Since the equilibrium that one observes in a labor market with a distortionary payroll tax is 
not  a  Pareto-optimum,  for  instance,  the  wage  subsidy  might  be  thought  to  bring  the 
equilibrium closer to the optimum - not considering, though, either the distortions that 
would be created in other markets in financing the subsidy (Goulder and Williams, 2003), 
or the possible negative effects on other types of labor (Sorensen, 1997). 
On the other hand, in the presence of a payroll tax with perfect tax/benefit linkage, in the 
sense  that  the  payroll  tax  revenues  are  used  to  finance  programs  which  only  benefit 
workers, such as retirement benefits – Summers (1989), Gruber (1997) – the wage subsidy 
can  be  thought  of  as  a  distortionary  measure  that  tends  to  lead  to  a  welfare  loss. 
Reasonably, of course, welfare could increase for society as a whole in the above situation 
if, for instance, the young workers that were previously unemployed and that get a job as a 
result  of  the  wage  subsidy  were  previously  engaging  in  criminal  or  other  external-
diseconomy generating activities (Phelps, 1994), or were receiving welfare/unemployment 
benefits paid by society (Bell and Orr, 1994; Snower, 1994; Bell et al., 1999), and if the 
wage subsidy is actually able to create new jobs in the economy and not simply inducing 
firms to replace high cost workers with low cost workers (Warburton and Frketich, 1996). 
Finally, in the presence of a wage floor that prevents the wage from adjusting in order to 
equate labor demand and supply, the introduction of a wage subsidy might lead to a welfare 
increase by easing the distortion provoked by the minimum wage (Nickell and Bell, 1997). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the CFL wage subsidy 
program, while section 3 presents a simple model for studying firms’ decisions on whether 
to employ subsidized youth work. Section 4 considers the effect of a wage subsidy in a 
labor market where a payroll tax generates a distortion (an excess burden), by creating a 
wedge between the wage received by employees and the labor cost borne by employers 
(Hamermesh, 1993). Section 5 studies the wage subsidy effect in the presence of a payroll   5 
tax with perfect tax/benefit linkage, while section 6 analyses the impact of a wage subsidy 
in the presence of a wage floor. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The “Contratto di Formazione – Lavoro” 
The Italian “Contratto di Formazione e Lavoro” (CFL, working and training contract) was 
introduced in 1985 to improve labour-market opportunities for young workers. Eligible 
people were, initially, workers younger than 30; over the years and across areas various age 
adjustments took place. 
The programme provided employers willing to hire eligible workers with two key benefits: 
• a  50% rebate on the labour cost via a reduction in social security contributions (SSC), 
amounting to 28% of gross pay; 
• automatic termination of the contract after a maximum of two years (i.e., zero firing 
costs). 
In principle, the programme should have featured an on-the-job training component. In 
fact, it seems that most times it was not implemented. 
Over the years several reforms of the programme took place. In June 1988 the SSC rebate  
was  reduced to 40%. Since  January 1991, the rebate was further reduced in the Centre-
North of Italy to 25%. Moreover, a more stringent rule was introduced, stating that a CFL-
hire during year t would be allowed provided that at least 50 per cent of the CFL workers 
completing their employment spell with the same employer during years t-1 and t-2  be 
retained on a permanent basis. 
To  properly  measure  the  CFL  programme  impact  one  has  to  take  into  account  the 
interaction of the programme with other concurrent incentive schemes. 
The main one provided firms operating in the South with a ten-year 100% holiday on SSC 
for each worker newly hired on a permanent basis, irrespective of age. As a result, firms 
operating in the South could choose between two options: 
(a)  hiring a young worker under  the CFL program: 
(b) hiring any worker under the special conditions accorded to the Mezzogiorno. 
Not surprisingly, option (a) was seldom preferred, and very few CFL workers were hired in 
the  South  until  December  1991,  when  the  special  scheme  for  the  Mezzogiorno  was 
cancelled. 
In recent years the CFL scheme has been slowly phased out, as new policy instruments and 
more  flexible  working  contracts  have  been  introduced  under  the  so-called  “Pacchetto 
Treu” of 1996. 
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3. A simple model 
In order to understand how are firms’ incentives to hire young workers affected by the 
existence of a subsidy, consider the following super-simple model. A firm faces a vacancy  
in period 1, which may be filled by two alternative contracts: 
(1) a permanent working contract with an experienced worker (PC); 
(2) a subsidized temporary contract (training-and-work contract for youth, CFL). 
The permanent contract (PC) carries with it a total labour cost per worker equal to w(1 + t) 
– with t being the payroll tax rate and w the wage to the worker – and a firing cost equal to 
FC. 
With the temporary one-year contract (CFL),  labour cost equals: w(1 + [1–s]t)< w(1 + t), 
with 0<s<1 being the subsidy rate. However, the firm faces a training cost equal to Z.
2 At 
the end of year 1, the temporary contract CFL can either be interrupted at no cost, or 
renewed as a PC contract in period 2. If a contract is not renewed at the end of period 1, 
the firm will suffer a vacancy in period 2. 
Nature has two states: a “good” state, G, occurring with probability g, and a “bad” state 
(B), occurring with probability (1-g). If the favourable state occurs, firms’ revenues are 
positive, otherwise they are 0. In particular, firms’ revenues when the state of nature is 
good depend on the quality of the worker. Workers’ quality is  “high” (H)  with probability  
p – leading to revenues PH – and “low” (L) with probability (1 –p) – leading to revenues 
PL – with [PH – w(1 + t)]>PV>[PL – w(1 + t)], where PV is firm’s revenues with a 
vacancy. On the other hand, firms’ revenues are zero if the state is bad, irrespective of 
workers’ quality. 
Worker’s quality can be observed at the end of period 1. If the worker turns out to be 
“high quality” he is retained; otherwise he is fired. However, only if nature is “profitable” 
in period 1 will the firm continue operations in period 2. If year 1 is lousy, the firm will fire 
her worker (at cost FC if the contract is permanent, at no cost if the contract is temporary), 
no matter how good he/she is. 
Since in period 2 the expected profit for the firm will be the same, irrespective of the 
decision made in period 1 as to the type of contract (because either it will face a vacancy, or 
it will employ workers with a permanent contract), it is easy to derive that the firm prefers 
to use the temporary youth contract CFL if: 
 
                                                 
2  Z  might  also  be  interpreted  as  the  loss  of  productivity  associated  with  hiring  a  young 
(inexperienced) worker in place of an adult experienced one.   7 
wst + (1 – gp)FC > Z                 (1) 
 
Equation (1) has a straightforward interpretation: the temporary youth contract CFL is 
preferred  to  the  permanent  contract  PC  if  the  fiscal  opportunity  cost  of  not  using  a 
temporary contract (value of the subsidy: wst) plus the expected firing cost (if either the 
state  of  nature  is  bad  or  the  worker’s  quality  is  low)  is  higher  than  the  training  cost 
associated with the subsidized contract. 
Equation (1) illustrates that a number of factors play a role in determining a firm’s choice  
and that estimating the impact of the wage subsidy is not an easy task. In particular, it is 
clear that, even in the absence of the subsidy, the firm might still decide to employ a 
worker with a permanent contract. 
In  the  following,  we  attempt  to  estimate  the  benefits  and  costs  associated  with  the 
existence of the CFL wage subsidy, and argue that the benefit-cost balance is going to 
depend crucially on the pre-existing distortions in the youth labor market. 
 
4. A wage subsidy in a tax distorted labor market  
Assume that a selective wage subsidy s on youth employment is introduced in a market that 
suffers from previous fiscal distortions, in the sense that employers are subject to a payroll 
tax  (t),  and  there  is  no  linkage  between  payroll  tax  revenues  and  benefits  received  by 
workers. Say that the payroll tax equals 30% of the wage received by workers. 
Within a frictionless labor market, depicted in figure 1, the labor demand function in the 
absence of the tax is D, the labor supply function is S, and the Pareto optimum equilibrium 
is at point O. As a consequence of the wage tax, the labor demand schedule shifts down to 
D0, while the labor supply function S does not shift.
3 
The  equilibrium  with  the  payroll  tax  t=0.3  is  at  point  H,  with  equilibrium  wage  IJ, 
employment ILH, and labor cost IN (=1.30 ´ IJ). Given the market demand and supply of 
labor  (D  and  S),  the  Marshallian  approximations  to  employers’  and  workers’  surplus 
(Hausman, 1981) are represented by areas MAN and JHG in figure 2, with NAHJ being 
the total payroll tax yield that funds general public spending, and AOH the deadweight loss 
caused by the payroll tax. 
Now consider the introduction of an employer side wage subsidy. Assume that the subsidy 
is a payroll tax reduction for firms employing young workers, such that employers pay 15% 
(instead of 30%) on top of the wage. Since we are tackling here the case of no payroll 
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tax/workers’ benefit linkage, we can assume for the moment that, as a consequence of the 
wage  subsidy,  the  government  raises  revenues  equal  to  15%  of  the  wage  in  a  non 
distortionary way, and we can disregard what those revenues are spent on. 
Labor demand goes back up to D1, with an equilibrium at point C. Net wage for workers 
goes up from IJ to IP. Labor cost goes down from IN (=1.30 ´ IJ) to IQ (=1.15 ´ IP). 
It is straightforward to see that welfare increases by area ABCH in figure 1. The welfare 
gain can be attributed to the excess burden fall (from area AOH to area BOC) that is 
obtained  through  the  drop  in  the  distortionary  tax,  under  the  assumption  that  the 
government  can  raise  in  a  non-distortionary  way  an  amount  of  revenue  equal  to  the 
foregone payroll tax yield. 
Using reliable estimates of the labor demand elasticity (hD) and labor supply elasticity (eS) 
of young eligible workers (Katz, 1996), and starting from the observed equilibrium in the 
youth labor market (employment=450,000; wage=€8,300; point C in figure 1), we want to 
compute a measure of the welfare impact of the labor market program consisting of a wage 
subsidy as a fraction s=0.15 of the wage. 
As a first approximation, the Marshallian measures of employers’ and workers’ surplus are 
used  to  compute  the  welfare  change  (Slesnick,  1998).  Table  1  shows  the  estimated 
counterfactuals – that is the level of employment and wage that would be observed in the 
absence of the wage subsidy (point H in figure 1) – under different hypotheses about the 
labor demand and supply schedules. 
Table 2 shows the estimated effects – in terms of percentage increases – on employment 
and wages of young workers as a result of the 15% wage subsidy, as well as the estimated 
welfare change (area ABCH in figure 1). Two series of results are presented, based on 
different hypotheses on the functional form of the demand and supply schedules: linear 
and constant elasticity. The employment and wage effects of the 15% subsidy are roughly 
similar  under  the  linearity  and  constant  elasticity  hypotheses,  and  correspond  to  the 
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Since, with 450,000 eligible workers, the cost of the program amounts to €560 million per 
year (€1250 per worker), and given that the employment effect of the wage subsidy is   9 
estimated  to  range  from  1%  to  3.5%,  depending  on  the  labor  demand  and  supply 
elasticities, the welfare increase can be estimated to be as little as 8.5 to 27 million euros. 
Moreover, it should be taken into account that raising revenues to compensate the payroll 
tax reduction might well generate an excess burden and welfare losses in other markets that 
more than offset the above gain. 
 
5. A wage subsidy in a perfect tax/benefit linkage labor market  
Assume now that, as a consequence of the t=0.3 wage tax, both the labor demand and the 
labor supply schedules move, due to perfect tax/benefit linkage. While, as before, the labor 
demand schedule shifts down to D0, the labor supply function S shifts down to S0: since 
workers value the benefits that are “bought” with payroll taxes, they are willing to accept 
lower money wages (Gruber, 1997). 
The equilibrium – depicted in figure 2 – with the payroll tax t=0.3 is at point K, with 
equilibrium wage IH, the same equilibrium employment as in the no tax case (ILO), and the 
same labor cost as in the no tax case: IV (=1,30 ´ IH). No deadweight loss is caused by the 
payroll tax in this case, as it is entirely shifted onto the employees, and it works as a perfect 
benefit tax. 
Now let us consider the introduction of the wage subsidy. Assume again that the subsidy is 
a payroll tax reduction for firms employing young workers, such that employers pay 15% 
(instead of 30%) on top of the wage, with the other 15% being borne by government. 
Labor demand goes back up to D1, with an equilibrium at point Z and employment at LZ. 
Labor supply does not move because workers keep on receiving the entire benefit (PZ), 
which is partly paid for by employers (UZ) and partly by government (PU). Net wage to 
workers goes up from IH to IT. Labor cost goes down from IV (=1.30 ´ IH) to IR (=1,15 
´ IT). The total cost of the subsidy for the government (amounting to €560 million) is 
QPUR, while the cost of the payroll tax for firms (€560 million) is RUZT. 
With respect to the no subsidy and full payroll tax equilibrium, firms’ surplus has increased 
by the area VOUR. It is easy to see that workers’ surplus has increased by the area QPOV. 
As the government bears the cost of the subsidy equal to the area QPUR, overall welfare as 
a consequence of the subsidy has fallen by the area of the triangle POU. 
Tables 3 and 4 show that the wage subsidy has a small employment effect, and that the 
welfare  loss  represented  by  area  POU  ranges  from  €3  million  to  about  €10  million, 
depending on the elasticities. To this loss, though, it should be added the likely excess 
burden that has been created in other markets in raising an amount of  revenues equal to 
QPUR, as well as the potential welfare loss for substitution of non eligible workers.   10 
 
6. A wage subsidy in a market with an implicit minimum wage 
Finally, consider the presence of an implicit minimum wage in the youth labor market – 
that is the presence of a wage floor generated by minimum wage laws, unions or the benefit 
system – and assume, sticking to a purely neoclassical framework, that such wage floor 
prevents the labor market from clearing, causing involuntary unemployment.
4 As argued by 
Nickell and Bell (1997), this is a situation where a payroll tax cut on the unskilled might 
have a significant long-run employment effect. 
To see how the impact of the wage subsidy in that case could be, figure 3 shows: a) the no 
tax labor market equilibrium (point O); b) the labor market equilibrium with a 30% payroll 
tax, perfect tax/benefit linkage, and no minimum wage (point O’); c) the labor market 
equilibrium with a 30% payroll tax, perfect tax/benefit linkage, and a minimum wage IW 
(point A). 
In the latter instance, involuntary unemployment is AB and total surplus is given by area 
YAEF  (=KMRQ):  employers’  surplus  is  KMH  (ºYAW)  and  workers’  surplus  is 
WAEF=WARQ+QREF, where QREF (ºHMAW) is the benefit received by employees 
and financed by the payroll tax on firms. 
Consider now a 15% wage subsidy. With reference to figure 3, labor demand shifts up to 
D1, with equilibrium at G and unemployment equal to GB. Employment raises by AG, 
employers’ surplus raises by HMPC, workers’ surplus raises by AGJE, and the cost of the 
subsidy is HNPC (ºCPGW). Consequently, as MNPºAGL by construction, welfare goes 
up for society as a whole by ALJE. 
Tables 5 and 6 show a simulation of the Marshallian welfare impact of the subsidy in this 
case. Based on a 18% rate of youth unemployment in the presence of the subsidy (GB = 
100,000 unemployed youths in figure 3), observed youth employment (LG) of 450,000, and 
minimum wage (IW) of €8,300, it turns out that, relative to the no subsidy counterfactual, 
the payroll tax cut can generate an employment effect of up to 15 percentage points (LA to 
LG in figure 3). 
In terms of employers’ surplus, labor cost falls from €10,790 (=1.30 ´ €8,300=IH in figure 
3) to €9,545 (=1.15 ´ €8,300=IC), leading to an increase in employers’ surplus of over €500 
million (area HMPC). As for workers, employment of previously unemployed youths at the 
€8,300 wage generates a surplus gain (area AGJE) of up to €375 million. Since the cost of 
                                                 
4 However, see Card and Krueger (1994) for alternative theories and evidence on the impact of 
minimum wages.   11 
the subsidy amounts to €560 million, the net welfare gain can be as large as 338 million 
euros. 
Even though this analysis does not consider the potential excess burden generated through 
taxation  to  finance  the  subsidy,  or  the  welfare  loss  from  displaced  workers  in  other 
markets, still the consideration of the inefficiency caused by a wage floor makes a very 
strong argument in favour of a wage subsidy targeted at low skill workers. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper argues that, in order to investigate the welfare effect of the introduction of an 
employer side wage subsidy on youth labor, it is crucial to recognize and quantify the 
degree  of  pre-existing  fiscal  distortions  and  inefficiencies  to  which  the  relevant  labor 
market is subject to. 
While the framework of the analysis is pretty naive and most of the results are preliminary 
and  of  a  mainly  qualitative  nature,  still  some  of  the  findings  are  rather  suggestive.  In 
particular, the paper shows that, in the case of perfect tax/benefit linkage case with a wage 
floor, a selective wage subsidy can substantially increase welfare, because, in the presence of 
a  wage  floor  that  determines  an  inefficient  allocation  of  resources,  the  wage  subsidy 
operates as to move the market outcome closer to the optimum. 
Clearly, the above analysis represents just a first step in the direction of a complete welfare 
analysis of a selective wage subsidy. General equilibrium considerations (Sorensen, 1997; 
Goulder and Williams, 2003) suggest that it might be the case that the reduced labor cost of 
young workers after the subsidy depresses the demand for other types of labor (Snower, 
1994), therefore decreasing welfare in other markets (non eligible workers), or reduces the 
incentive for the unskilled to acquire training (Nickell and Bell, 1997). Moreover, it should 
be taken into account that raising revenues to compensate the payroll tax reduction in the 
youth labour market might well generate an excess burden in other markets, that could 
partially or totally offset the welfare gain in the unskilled youth labor market. 
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Figure 2 
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 Figure 3 
A wage subsidy in a perfect tax/benefit linkage labor market 
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Table 1 














-0.1  0.4  linear  445.4  8,100  10,520 
-0.5  0.4  linear  437.8  7,740  10,050 
-1.0  0.4  linear  434.7  7,600  9,880 
-0.1  0.4  constant elasticity  445.6  8,100  10,520 
-0.5  0.4  constant elasticity  437.9  7,750  10,070 
-1.0  0.4  constant elasticity  434.5  7,600  9,880 
 
Notes 
1)  observed market equilibrium with 15% subsidy is at: employment = 450,000; annual wage = €8,300; 
labor cost = €9,545; 
2)  with  linear  demand  and  supply  schedules,  the  elasticities  are  evaluated  at  the  observed  market 
equilibrium; 





















-0.1  0.4  linear  1.03  2.47  +8.5 
-0.5  0.4  linear  2.79  7.24  +21.7 
-1.0  0.4  linear  3.52  9.21  +27.0 
 
Notes 
1)  observed market equilibrium with 15% subsidy is at: employment = 450,000; annual wage = €8,300. 
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Table 3 














-0.1  0.4  linear  445.4  8,100  10,520 
-0.5  0.4  linear  437.8  7,740  10,050 
-1.0  0.4  linear  434.7  7,600  9,880 
 
Notes 
1)  observed market equilibrium with 15% subsidy is at: employment = 450,000; annual wage = €8,300; 
labor cost = €9,545; 





















-0.1  0.4  linear  1.03  2.47  -2.9 
-0.5  0.4  linear  2.79  7.24  -7.6 
-1.0  0.4  linear  3.52  9.21  -9.5 
 
Notes 
1)  observed market equilibrium with 15% subsidy is at: employment = 450,000; annual wage = €8,300. 
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Table 5 
Estimated counterfactual in a perfect tax/benefit linkage labor market 














-0.1  0.4  linear  444.1  8,300  10,790 
-0.5  0.4  linear  420.6  8,300  10,790 
-1.0  0.4  linear  391.4  8,300  10,790 
 
Notes 
1)  observed market equilibrium with 15% subsidy is at: employment = 450,000; annual wage = €8,300 
(minimum wage); labor cost = €9,545; involuntary unemployment = 100,000; unemployment rate = 
18%. 





Impact of 15% wage subsidy in a perfect tax/benefit linkage labor market 
















-0.1  0.4  linear  1.33  --  +26.3 
-0.5  0.4  linear  6.99  --  +148.2 
-1.0  0.4  linear  14.97  --  +337.8 
 
Notes 
1)  observed market equilibrium with 15% subsidy is at: employment = 450,000; annual wage = €8,300 
(minimum wage); involuntary unemployment = 100,000; unemployment rate = 18%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 